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We investigate the informativeness of dividends and the associated tax credits with respect 
to earnings persistence. After confirming that dividend paying firms have more persistent 
earnings than non-dividend paying firms, we show that the taxation status of the dividend is 
also important. Firms that pay dividends with a full tax credit attached have significantly 
more persistent earnings than firms that pay dividends which carry no associated tax credit. 
Consistent with higher levels of tax credits identifying more mature firms, those paying 
dividends with full tax credits have significantly less persistent losses than firms that pay  
dividends with only partial tax credits. Further, market pricing tests confirm that the 
incremental information in dividends and tax credits contributes to reductions in market 
mispricing of the persistence of earnings and earnings components. Our results are robust to 






We investigate whether two simple indicators, dividends and dividend-related tax credits, 
provide users with information that helps assess earnings quality. Specifically, we examine 
whether dividends and higher levels of tax credits indicate higher earnings persistence. 
Persistence is an important attribute of earnings (Dechow and Schrand, 2004; Hanlon, 2005). 
A persistent earnings series is more readily useable as a short-cut to valuation (e.g., via 
multiples; Penman, 1991; Schipper and Vincent, 2003). Persistent earnings are also a better 
predictor of future earnings (Sloan, 1996). Our persistence tests are further supplemented 
with market pricing tests that assess whether dividend and tax credit information impact on 
the efficiency with which investors price the persistence of earnings and earnings 
components.  
 
Our analysis is motivated by the relative absence of empirical evidence that directly 
demonstrates a signalling role for dividends. Baker and Wurgler (2012) argue that although 
surveys suggest that managers view dividends as an important signal for investors (Brav et 
al., 2005), there is remarkably little empirical evidence of how this occurs. Further, many of 
the economic mechanisms that underlie well-known signalling models, such as the costs that 
can be borne in raising external funds or the ability to bear costly taxes, are explicitly ruled 
out by the same survey evidence used to cite managerial support attributing a signalling role 
for dividends. In contrast, we identify a link between an existing theory of dividends (the 
life-cycle theory) and earnings attributes such that dividends and their tax status are expected 
to serve as a signal of earnings persistence. 
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We draw on an environment (Australia) which is particularly appropriate for investigating 
these issues. For the period we examine, Australia has had a taxation system which 
eliminates double taxation on dividends by providing shareholders with an attached 
entitlement to a tax credit for dividend income received on which company tax has already 
been paid. This setting has the added advantage of introducing a second dividend related 
signal, namely its tax status (i.e., the extent to which a tax credit is attached). We therefore 
consider both the dividend paying status of the firm, as well as the tax status of the dividend. 
Australian earnings also have lower levels of persistence compared to the U.S., due in part to 
the higher frequency of losses (Coulton et al., 2005). Hayn (1995) shows that losses reduce 
the informativeness of earnings. Given the increasing frequency and persistence of losses in 
Australia and elsewhere, it is important to explicitly consider losses in explaining the low 
level of earnings persistence (Hayn, 1995; Balkrishna et al., 2007). Hence, we also explicitly 
examine how dividend paying status (and the tax status of the dividend) informs assessment 
of loss persistence. 
 
Our research makes a number of contributions that are likely to be of interest to investors, 
policy makers and academics. First, similar to Skinner and Soltes (2011), we identify 
circumstances in which earnings are more persistent. Second, we provide evidence on 
whether dividends and the associated tax credits increase the informativeness of profits, 
losses and accruals. Third, our tests show that the information in dividends and tax credits 
helps investors correctly price the persistence of earnings components. This is particularly 
important as the failure by investors to correctly price the persistence of earnings and its 
components can lead to mispricing (Sloan, 1996). Fourth, our study also contributes more 
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broadly to the existing literature on the impact of taxation regimes on dividends and their 
informativeness (Li 2014, Baker et al. 2012). 
 
Dividend-paying firms have different characteristics to firms that do not pay dividends 
(Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Hand and Landsman, 2005). DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo’s (2006) full payout model lends itself to dividend payments corresponding to the 
different stages in the firm life cycle.1 As firms mature, becoming more profitable and self-
funding, they are more likely to pay dividends. Firm characteristics such as profitability and 
low growth options associated with dividend payments are also likely to drive earnings 
persistence. Hence, we expect to observe a positive association between dividend payments 
and earnings persistence. Our approach contrasts with much of the dividend signalling 
literature, which focuses on the implications of dividend changes, and which yields mixed 
results. On the other hand, survey evidence (Brav et al., 2005) suggests that managers are 
primarily concerned with dividend persistence, which also underlies the arguments of 
Lintner (1956). Our approach provides a link between the payment of dividends and firm 
valuation (i.e., the signalling role of dividends as outlined by Miller and Rock (1985) and 
others) by recognizing that dividends are informative about earnings persistence, and 
earnings persistence is itself a consideration in valuation. 
 
However, while our initial focus is on the dividend-paying status of the firm, we also 
recognize that dividend paying firms are themselves not a homogenous group. Australia’s 
dividend tax system potentially provides users with an additional signal about firm 
                                                 
1 Similar results supporting a life-cycle theory have been reported for Australian firms (Coulton and 
Ruddock, 2011). 
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profitability.2 When Australian companies pay tax in Australia they accrue imputation credits 
(known as “franking credits”) that can then be attached to dividends (Jun et al. 2011). This 
system eliminates double taxation on dividends (i.e., where income is taxed in the hands of 
the company and then in the hands of the shareholders). Dividends can be declared fully 
franked (with a 100% tax credit); partially franked or unfranked (0% tax credit). The higher 
the level of franking credits the less tax certain shareholders are required to pay. We argue 
that as firms mature they will pay more tax, so consistent with the firm life cycle we expect 
that, for dividend paying firms, franking credits provide an additional incremental indicator 
of earnings persistence.3  
 
At the same time, there is also an important difference between a dividend and a franking 
credit. While the decision to pay a dividend and the size of any dividend is a choice that 
managers make, there is less discretion with respect to the level of franking. During the early 
years of our sample, the relevant regulations meant that the maximum level of available 
franking would be applied to any dividends paid. Subsequent to tax simplification rules that 
came into effect on 1 July 2002, corporate tax entities can allocate a franking credit up to the 
maximum franking credit allowable, and can select the level of franking having regard to 
their existing and expected franking surplus (ATO, 2004). As there is no benefit to the entity 
                                                 
2Australia and New Zealand are the only two OECD countries to currently have a full imputation system. 
Dividend imputation systems have been abandoned in the United Kingdom (in 1999), Germany (2001), 
Finland (2005) and Norway (2006) See Chapter B2-3 The Future of Dividend Imputation in Australia’s 
Future Tax System Report to the Treasurer (2010). In 2003 the U.S. reduced the tax rate on dividends to 15 
percent. During this time Treasury argued for the full removal of this tax. It is conceivable that the US may 
adopt a dividend imputation system in the future (see Report by the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal 
Tax Reform pp 99-102). Canada has a system which provide for a dividend tax credit for part of the 
underlying corporate tax rate. 
3 In the remainder of the paper we use the term “franking credit” to describe the tax credits associated with 
dividends under the Australian imputation system. 
 7 
to hold onto franking credits, and some benefit to shareholders in receiving them, entities 
typically pay out the maximum amount of franking credits allowed.  
 
Our results confirm that under a full imputation system, paying a dividend signals more 
persistent profits (i.e., greater earnings persistence where the earnings result is a profit rather 
than a loss). Given the increasing incidence of accounting losses, especially in Australia, we 
explicitly test whether dividends send an asymmetric persistence signal that profits will 
persist and losses will reverse. We find strong evidence that firms that pay dividends have 
more persistent profits and less persistent losses than firms that do not pay dividends. 
Payment of dividends therefore increases the informativeness of losses. This evidence is 
consistent with earnings persistence being a function of the life cycle of the firm where 
dividends proxy for the steady state profitability stage of the life-cycle, and is also consistent 
with the results in Skinner and Soltes (2011) 
 
We also find that earnings persistence is increasing in dividend franking. Firms paying fully 
franked dividends that report an accounting loss have significantly less persistent losses (i.e., 
their losses are more likely to reverse). Higher levels of franking credits are evidence of a 
history of prior profitability, and we would expect this inherent firm characteristic to be 
associated with higher earnings persistence. 
 
Finally, we use market pricing tests to assess whether the market acts as if it uses dividend 
and franking credit information to correctly price the expected persistence of earnings and 
its components. These tests provide support for the claim that dividend and franking credit 
information can reduce market mispricing of earnings. Dividend and franking credit 
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information also improves the market’s pricing of the cash flow and accrual components of 
earnings.   
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we explain why dividends 
and franking credits are likely to be associated with different phases of the life cycle, and in 
turn why the life cycle is itself likely to be associated with earnings persistence. We 
subsequently develop testable hypotheses. Section 3 explains our data sources, sample 
selection and research design, while in Section 4 we discuss our results. Sensitivity tests are 
described in Section 5 and our conclusions in Section 6.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
(i) Earnings persistence  
Earnings persistence is an important characteristic of earnings quality (Dechow and Schrand, 
2004). Given the low level of earnings persistence and the increasing incidence of accounting 
losses it is important to know what helps investors assess earnings persistence. Sloan (1996) 
shows that investors do not appear to correctly price the different components of earnings, 
in that they overestimate the persistence of the accrual component of earnings and 
underestimate the persistence of cash flows, thus resulting in mispricing. Dechow et al. 
(2008) attempt to disentangle two competing explanations (i.e., growth or earnings 
management) for the accrual anomaly identified in Sloan (1996). They focus on whether cash 
is retained or distributed, and decompose the cash flow component of earnings accordingly, 
as sources and uses of cash will likely have different levels of persistence. Cash retained can 
be wasted by poor or opportunistic managerial decisions (Jensen, 1986). In comparison to 
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distributions to debt holders, distributions to shareholders are discretionary and are more 
likely to signal incrementally greater earnings persistence.  
 
The retention and distribution of cash is also known to vary systematically over the life cycle 
of the firm (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2001; 
Grullon et al., 2002). Dechow et al.’s (2008) results are therefore consistent with earnings 
persistence varying over a firm’s life cycle as they find the cash component of earnings 
retained is the least persistent component of cash flows.  
 
Firms establishing profitability typically have higher growth options, rely on external funding 
and retain more cash than mature, profitable firms. At this stage in their life cycle these firms 
are more likely to have persistent losses. For example, the challenge for new entrants to a 
market is to build and maintain a customer base for their products. As smaller players they 
lack bargaining power and their earnings may be squeezed by powerful suppliers or 
customers. Even if they are not reporting losses, such firms often have volatile earnings. The 
fact that firms in the initial phase of the life cycle have significant growth opportunities may 
also result in less persistent earnings, cash flows and accruals (Fairfield et al., 2003; Hribar 
and Collins, 2002). Accruals (such as the purchase of inventory) can be inflated in the 
current period in preparation for future growth and thus are more likely to reverse. It also 
takes time to realise a return on investment. As firms mature they become more profitable 
and are able to internally generate cash in excess of their investment requirements. The 
optimal policy will then be to retain sufficient earnings to invest in positive NPV projects 
and distribute excess cash to shareholders. Payment of a dividend is therefore expected to be 
evidence of a firm reaching sustainable profitability. 
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(ii) Dividends and earnings quality 
There is a long history of research from Miller and Modigliani (1961) that examines the link 
between dividends and earnings. A particular focus has been whether dividend changes 
signal future earnings changes and stock price reactions (Healy and Palepu, 1988; Grullon et 
al., 2002). More recent evidence examines whether dividends per se are a signal with respect 
to earnings quality. There is evidence of dividends and cash distributions being associated 
with more persistent earnings (Dechow et al., 2008; Skinner and Soltes, 2011), as well as a 
lower level of both unexpected accruals and errors in the mapping of accruals into cash 
flows (Tong and Miao, 2011). 
 
Using a simple one-period persistence model, Skinner and Soltes (2011) show that dividends 
convey information about future earnings incremental to information in current period 
earnings. We expect the impact of dividends to be stronger than those reported in U.S. 
studies for a number of reasons. First, once an Australian firm reaches the stage in the life 
cycle where it is optimal to distribute cash there is no tax disincentive to start making 
distributions. Secondly, earnings persistence has been shown to be lower for Australian firms 
than their U.S. counterparts (Balkrishna et al., 2007). This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Firms that pay dividends have more (less) persistent profits (losses) than firms that do not 
pay dividends 
 
Australian firms can declare fully-franked dividends (i.e., a full tax credit is attached to the 
dividend); partially-franked dividends (i.e., a partial tax credit); or unfranked dividends (i.e., 
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no tax credit). Hence, the level of franking potentially communicates information about the 
effective tax rate on declared income and by implication, the life cycle of the firm (Coulton 
and Ruddock, 2011). Firms that pay dividends with a higher level of franking have a higher 
effective tax rate. Hanlon (2005) argues that small differences in book-tax income for U.S. 
firms are seen as a signal of high quality earnings. We argue that the lower effective tax rate 
is a function of firm life cycle rather than managerial opportunism, and that a higher earned-
to-contributed equity ratio indicates that firms have a history of profits. Coulton and 
Ruddock (2011) show that dividend-paying (Australian) firms have a higher proportion of 
retained earnings in total shareholders’ equity than non-dividend paying firms. It also implies 
a greater likelihood of recovering from losses (DeAngelo et al., 2006). We therefore expect 
that the level of franking on dividends to be positively associated with a higher persistence of 
profits and lower persistence of losses. Our second hypothesis follows: 
H2:  Profitable (Loss-making) firms that pay highly franked dividends have more (less) 
persistent earnings than firms that pay dividends with lower franking levels 
 
(ii) Pricing of earnings, dividends and franking credits 
Our first two hypotheses predict that dividends and franking credits are incrementally 
informative with respect to earnings persistence. Such information should therefore assist 
investors to correctly price earnings and its components. Dividends represent a commitment 
to distribute cash. Hence, they may be viewed as a more credible source of information 
about the persistence of earnings (and therefore the future prospects of the firm) than say, 
management earnings forecasts. Brealey and Myers (2003, pg 428) state that dividends send a 
signal to the market because management is “putting money where their mouth is”. Similarly 
Penman (1983) finds dividend-based forecast models to be more accurate than the direct 
forecast models. A dividend is a signal backed by cash, and is more visible than other 
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announcements (Asquith and Mullins, 1983). More importantly, dividends are expected to 
indicate that the firm is reaching the mature phase of its life cycle. As such the market is 
better able to assess the firm’s growth opportunities and the resulting earnings persistence. 
Further, Dechow et al. (2008) find evidence that cash distributions are informative. Our 
third set of hypotheses follows: 
 
H3a:  Earnings persistence expectations are more efficiently priced where earnings are supplemented 
with earnings information embedded in dividends and franking credits  
H3b:  Persistence expectations for both the accruals and cash flow components of earnings are more 
efficiently priced where earnings are supplemented with earnings information embedded in 
dividends and franking credits.  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
(i) Data and sample selection 
We use data from three sources. Financial statement data are taken from the Morningstar 
Aspect Financial database. Dividend and franking credit data are extracted from the SPPR 
dataset.4 We capture the total cash dividends paid each year and estimate the extent of 
franking by taking the weighted average value of franking credits.5 If the company has a 
dividend reinvestment scheme, we manually check our calculations against dividends paid as 
reported in the cash flow statement. For all firms distributing unfranked dividends, we 
investigate whether the firm is eligible to accrue franking credits. 
 
                                                 
4 The Share Price and Price Relative dataset is maintained by SIRCA. 
5 For example, if the first dividend was 100% franked and paid on 2,000,000 shares and the second 
dividend was 50% franked and paid on 2,500,000 shares, we would calculate the total franking credit as 
[100 * (2,000,000/4,500,000)] + [50 * (2,500,000/4,500,000)] = 72.22% franked. 
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Our sample period is between January 1993 and December 2010. We require observations to 
have both operating income and total asset data. As shown in Table 1, we begin with a 
maximum of 27,121 firm-year observations. Observations missing any required data items as 
well as companies having a change of financial year are excluded. This results in the loss of 
6,880 observations, the vast majority of which are due to the requirement for observations to 
have both leading (future) earnings and lagged assets. We exclude 1,832 observations that are 
financial institutions (ASX code 16, 17, 19 or 20 or GICS code 40) as they have a unique set 
of rules governing revenue and expense recognition.6 To reduce the influence of extreme 
observations we delete the top and bottom 1% of our sample on current year and one year-
ahead earnings (637 observations).7  
 
Our final sample consists of 16,663 firm-year observations. Our selection procedure biases 
our sample towards larger, older and more profitable firms. Similarly the coverage of the 
databases used in this study (particularly the Aspect database) increases over time, meaning 
the bias is more prevalent in earlier sample years.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
(ii) Earnings persistence of dividend paying firms 
Our basic test is a one-period-ahead persistence model (as in Skinner and Soltes, 2011). We 
regress future earnings on current earnings. The parameter on current earnings implies the 
level of earnings persistence. The incremental signaling value is captured by the interaction 
                                                 
6 Financials and Property Trusts (GICS 40) also includes a number of property developers, which we do not 
exclude.  
7 Inferences from both our persistence and our pricing tests are not affected by this exclusion. Similar 
results also obtain if we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of earnings and future earnings.  
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terms between earnings and our variables of interest. Our sample contains a large number of 
loss observations (over 53% of sample firm-year observations have negative operating 
earnings after tax), and a number of firms reporting a loss that pay dividends in the loss 
year.8 The behavior of losses is likely to vary with the firm life cycle. We therefore test the 
incremental earnings persistence of dividend-paying firms and loss making firms by 
estimating the following equation: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                      (1) 
Where: 
EARN it = Operating income after tax for company i in year t scaled by start of year 
total assets 
DIV it = indicator variable coded “1” if dividends were distributed by company i in 
year t, and zero otherwise.  
NEGit  = indicator variable coded “1” if operating income after tax for company i in 
year t is less than 0, and zero otherwise. 
 
If firms paying dividends have more persistent profits, then α3 should be positive. Losses are 
more likely to be persistent in the early phase of the life cycle (i.e., α5 will be positive) 
whereas mature firms that pay dividends while reporting a loss are more likely to have a 
temporary loss.9 We therefore expect α6 to be negative. 
                                                 
8 There were 800 firm-years where firms reported operating losses while paying a dividend (over four 
percent of our sample). 
9 Mature firms that report losses and do not pay dividends could be in the declining phase of their life cycle. 
We would suspect such firms to be more likely to have persistent losses.   
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To take into account the time series and cross-sectional dependence in the error terms of 
our persistence regressions, we calculate t-statistics using standard errors that are clustered by 
both firm and year (Petersen, 2008; Gow et al., 2010).10 
 
(iii) The role of franking credits 
Our second hypothesis is specific to firms that distribute dividends in a given year. Our aim 
is to assess whether higher franking credits indicate more persistent profits and less 
persistent losses. We test this in a number of different ways. First, we compare the earnings 
persistence of franked versus unfranked dividend paying firm-year observations. Second, we 
test for different levels of earnings persistence between fully franked and partially franked 
dividend payers. To test the former, we estimate the following equation: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+  𝛽𝛽5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                (2) 
 
where: 
FRANKit = indicator variable coded “1” if franked dividends (i.e., partially franked or 
fully franked dividends) are distributed by company i in year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
                                                 
10 The results of our persistence tests are qualitatively similar if we estimate our regressions annually and 
calculate coefficients and t-statistics following Fama and MacBeth (1973). 
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We partition our sample on profitability to help distinguish between these two types of 
unfranked dividend payers. The first type will only distribute dividends when profitable, 
whereas firms in the declining phase may continue distributing unfranked dividends while 
reporting a loss. In equation (2) the coefficient on EARN (β1) captures the earnings 
persistence of all profit-making unfranked dividend paying firms and β3 captures the 
incremental persistence of profit-making franked dividend paying firms (both partially and 
fully franked dividends). If β3 is positive this is evidence of franked dividend paying firms 
having more persistent earnings than firms that distribute unfranked dividends. We include 
an indicator variable for loss observations to test whether loss making firms that distribute 
unfranked dividends are providing a signal consistent with a steady state firm entering a 
declining phase (i.e., if β6 is positive).
11  
 
We next refine our tests by investigating the earnings persistence of firms that pay fully 
franked dividends. To do this we limit our analysis to a sample of firms that pay dividends 
with at least some level of franking. If profit-making firms that pay fully franked dividends 
have greater earnings persistence than those that pay partially franked dividends, the δ3 
coefficient will be positive. We estimate the following equation to capture the incremental 
earnings persistence of fully franked dividends over partially or unfranked dividends: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+  𝛿𝛿5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿𝛿6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                (3) 
where 
                                                 
11 Only Australian companies are eligible to accrue franking credits, so we estimate equation (2) on a 
sample of dividend-paying firms that excludes listed trusts and overseas domiciled firms. 
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FFRANKit = indicator variable coded “1” if fully franked dividends are distributed by 
company i in year t, and zero otherwise. 
 
Firms accumulate franking credits by paying tax (in Australia). A firm reporting a current or 
prior year loss may pay a partially franked dividend rather than reducing the dividend 
payment but leaving the reduced dividend fully franked. We include a slope and interaction 
term for firms reporting losses. 
 
(iv) Market pricing tests 
Our next set of tests investigates whether investors correctly price the differential earnings 
persistence associated with various dividend-related firm categories. We separately classify 
firm-years into those that distribute no dividends; unfranked dividends; partially franked 
dividends; and fully franked dividends.  
 
We estimate the following equation using OLS.  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (4) 
 
Following Sloan (1996), Xie (2001) and Hanlon (2005), we use a reporting year-end 
abnormal return measure (RETURNit+1), computed by taking the raw buy-hold return, 
inclusive of dividends and any liquidating distributions and subtracting the buy-hold return 
on a value-weighted portfolio of ASX-listed firms.12 The 12-month return accumulation 
period begins three months after the fiscal year-end of the year in which the financial 
                                                 
12 The use of some form of market adjusted returns (rather than raw returns) in prior studies reflects the 
basic implication of market efficiency underlying the Mishkin (1983) test, namely that expected abnormal 
returns are zero. 
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variables are measured. This is to allow enough time for the earnings information to be 
released and embedded in stock prices. If investors correctly price the persistence of 
earnings, we should not be able to reject the hypothesis that α1 in Equation (4) is equal to 
zero.  
 
Given that dividend paying and franking credit status are associated with firm size, we 
include a size control in our tests to produce a more robust specification of the pricing 
equation. Consistent with Kraft et al. (2007), SIZEit is an indicator variable created by 
ranking sample observations into quintiles based on start of year total assets.  
 
We next allow for the persistence of the cash flow and accrual components of earnings to 
vary, and estimate the following equation: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                (5) 
 
Where: 
CFOit is cash from operations, and ACCRUALSit = EARNit - CFOit 
 
We estimate each equation first on the full sample and then separately for our four categories 
of distribution: no dividends, unfranked dividends, partially franked dividends and fully 
franked dividends.  
 
It is possible that evidence of mispricing for the full sample may be attributable to loss 
observations. Given dividends and franking credits are particularly informative about the 
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persistence of losses, we also control for loss observations in our pricing tests, and estimate 
the following equation:  
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛼𝛼5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                (6) 
 
If we find that α1 or α2  are statistically different from zero, we would conclude that investors 
are not efficiently pricing the information about future returns in current period CFO and 
ACCRUALS respectively.  
 
Kraft et al (2007) show that omitted variables that may be useful in forecasting returns (and 
earnings) can impact on the inferences drawn in tests of market pricing. To address these 
concerns, we include the level and change in sales (REV and ∆REV), the level and change in 
capital expenditure (CAPEX and ∆CAPEX), lagged cash flows (CFOt-1), and lagged accruals 
(ACCRUALSt-1). These variables have been found by prior research to predict future returns 
or future earnings. 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛼𝛼5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼6∆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼8∆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼9𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
+ 𝛼𝛼10𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
+ �𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                 (7) 
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Consistent with our earlier tests, we include a loss indicator and interactions term with CFO 
and accruals: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛼𝛼5𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼7∆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼8𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛼𝛼9∆𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼11𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
+ �𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                 (8) 
 
4. RESULTS 
(i) Descriptive statistics 
The majority of our sample does not pay a dividend in any given year. This is consistent with 
the large number of loss observations in our sample. Approximately 52 percent of the 
sample observations are losses (measured as operating profits after tax). Of the observations 
that report positive operating profits, just over 70% distribute dividends in the profit-making 
year. In Table 2 we report the descriptive statistics for our sample partitioned on whether or 
not the firm distributes a dividend. 
 
Firms that distribute dividends have higher earnings and cash flows than firms that do not 
pay dividends.13 They are also substantially larger in terms of total assets. Firms that 
distribute dividends pay more tax than non-dividend distributers. Dividend payers have 
larger dollar amounts of cash on hand (unreported) although non-dividend payers have a 
significantly higher proportion of their total assets in the form of cash. The market-adjusted 
                                                 
13 The differences referred to in this paragraph are all significant at better than the 1% level using t-tests 
(Wilcoxon Z-tests) for testing differences in means (medians).  
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twelve-month buy and hold stock return is not statistically different between dividend and 
non-dividend paying firms. Consistent with DeAngelo et al. (2006), firms that distribute 
dividends fund a larger proportion of their assets with retained earnings than firms that do 
not pay dividends. On average non-dividend paying firms have significant accumulated 
losses. We view these differences as being broadly consistent with the life-cycle theory of 
dividends. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
(ii) Earnings persistence of dividend paying firms  
Results of our earnings persistence tests are reported in Table 3. The first column shows that 
profitable dividend distributing firms have more persistent earnings than profitable non-
dividend paying firms (the coefficient on profitable dividend paying firms (DIV*EARN) is 
0.326 and significant at better than the 1% level). For firms that distribute dividends while 
reporting a loss, the losses are significantly less persistent (i.e., are likely to reverse) than loss-
making firms that do not distribute a dividend (the coefficient on NEG*DIV*EARN is 
negative (−0.786) and significant at the 1% level). Overall we find strong support for 
hypothesis 1.  
 
The earnings persistence coefficients are much lower than the overall slope coefficient of 
around 0.8 reported in Skinner and Soltes (2011, Table 4), which they note is similar to prior 
U.S. research. This suggests that while the overall earnings persistence for Australian firms is 
much lower than for U.S. firms, the incremental earnings persistence associated with 
dividend payment is much larger. The adjusted R-squared in our model is 0.36 which is 
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lower than the corresponding R-squared in Skinner and Soltes (2011) of 0.79 for the 1994-
2005 period. However Skinner and Soltes do not partition their sample on profitability so 
the R-squared values are not directly comparable. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
(iii) Franking credits 
Firms that pay dividends are not a homogenous group. The level of franking credits attached 
to dividends provides additional information about the life cycle of the firm. Our second set 
of results in Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (2) on an “eligible sample” of 
dividend-paying firms that excludes overseas firms and listed trusts. Including separate slope 
and intercept coefficients for firms reporting losses again illustrates that firms have 
asymmetric earnings persistence. There is strong evidence that profit-making firms that 
distribute franked dividends have more persistent profits than profit-making firms 
distributing unfranked dividends (the coefficient on FRANK*EARN is 0.238 and significant 
at the 1% level). Similarly, losses  are likely to reverse (FRANK*NEG*EARN is -0.318 and 
significant at the 1% level). We therefore find initial support for hypothesis 2.  
 
We next examine firms that pay fully franked dividends. In our final set of results in Table 3 
we report the results of estimating equation (3). Profit-making firms that pay franked 
dividends (i.e., both partially and fully franked dividends) have persistent earnings (the 
coefficient on EARN is 0.483 and significant at the 1% level). Firms that pay fully franked 
dividends do not have significantly more persistent earnings than other profitable dividend-
paying firms (the coefficient on FFRANK*EARN is 0.088 but not reliably different from 
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zero). Loss making firms paying a fully franked dividend have earnings that are more likely 
to reverse (the coefficient on FFRANK*NEG*EARN is -0.369 and significant at the 5% 
level).  
 
Overall, we find evidence that firms distributing franked dividends have increased earnings 
persistence. In particular, franking credit information appears particularly informative about 
the behaviour of losses. The presence of franking credits suggests that it is more likely that 
profits will persist and losses will reverse. Given that we argue that dividends and high 
franking credits proxy for firm maturity we interpret these results as consistent with earnings 
persistence being a function of the firm life cycle. 
 
(iv) Impact of firm size 
One explanation for our results is that dividend policy and franking credits are a proxy for 
firm size and that larger firms are less risky and therefore have higher earnings persistence 
(Skinner and Soltes, 2011 address similar concerns). To investigate, Table 4 presents our 
earnings persistence regressions with our samples partitioned on firm size. We do this by 
forming quintiles based on start of year total assets. Panel A reports results of estimating 
equation (1) on our five size quintiles. Consistent with our earlier results, dividend paying 
firms have more persistent profits than non-dividend paying firms that report profits (the 
coefficient on DIV*EARN is positive for each size quintile, and significant at the 5% level 
or better for all but the smallest size quintile). Similarly, for our loss observations, results 
match those of our earlier tests showing that losses accompanied by dividend payments are 
more likely to reverse than other loss-making observations (the coefficient on 
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NEG*DIV*EARN is negative for all size portfolios, and significant for all but the smallest 
size portfolio).  
 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (2) on our ‘eligible sample’ of 
dividend-paying firms partitioned into size-based portfolios. The evidence suggests that our 
prior results are not attributable to failing to control for firm size. Paying a franked dividend 
is associated with more persistent profits and less persistent losses, with coefficients on the 
dividend interaction terms (FRANK*EARN and NEG*FRANK*EARN) significant for all 
quintiles except the loss-making observations in the smallest size quintile. Estimating 
equation (3) on size portfolios provides evidence consistent with that in Table 3. Profit-
making firms paying franked dividends have relatively high earnings persistence, but there is 
little incremental persistence for firms paying fully franked dividends.  
 
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that firm size does not appear to be driving our 
earnings persistence results. Further support for this conclusion is found by the re-
estimation of equations (1) through (3) with the inclusion of a size quintile indicator as an 
additional explanatory variable. When we undertake this analysis the coefficient on size is 
positive (that is, larger firms have more persistent earnings) but our dividend and franking 
credit variables of interest retain their sign and significance.14  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
(v) Market pricing tests 
                                                 
14 Results are untabulated but available upon request.  
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Our final hypothesis suggests that dividends and franking credits convey information to 
investors to help them refine their estimate of earnings persistence. We initially assess the 
market’s estimate of earnings persistence for our full sample, before partitioning on our four 
categories of dividend payers. As shown in the first column of Table 5, investors 
underweight earnings. The coefficient on EARN is 0.123 (t=5.33), consistent with positive 
earnings in year t being followed by positive returns in year t+1.   
 
The remaining columns in Panel A of Table 5 display the results of our pricing tests for 
firms partitioned by category of dividend payment. Results for non-dividend paying firms are 
similar to the full sample results with evidence that investors underweight earnings (the 
coefficient of 0.119, t=5.48). Tests on our samples of unfranked and partially franked 
dividend-payers do not allow us to reject the hypothesis that the market correctly prices the 
persistence information in earnings as the coefficients on EARN are not statistically 
significant. The incremental information in dividends and franking credits appears to reduce 
the degree of mispricing. However, for our sample of fully franked dividend paying firms, 
there is still some evidence that investors underweight current earnings, as the coefficient on 
EARN (0.140) is significantly different from zero (t=1.72).  
 
Results from tests of the pricing of earnings components (accruals and cash flows) reported 
in Panels B & C give additional insight into the mispricing reported in Panel A of Table 5. 
Investors underweight cash flows for the full sample, non-dividend paying observations, and 
also fully franked dividend observations (the coefficient on CFO is positive and significant at 
1% or better). For firm-years with unfranked or partially franked dividends, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis of efficient pricing of cash flows. The market also underweights accruals for 
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non-dividend payers for the overall sample and for non-dividend paying firm-years (i.e., the 
coefficients on ACCRUALS are positive and significant at 1% or better).  
 
Our pricing tests include controls for firm size to address the concern that our partition on 
dividend and franking credit status is effectively partitioning on size. However, the inclusion 
or exclusion of an indicator variable based on forming quintiles on start of year total assets 
does not affect our conclusions about the extent to which the market is correctly pricing 
earnings and its components, and the extent to which dividend and franking credit signals 
are used by the market in pricing persistence.  
  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Mispricing could also be a result of difficulties specific to valuing loss making firms. It 
appears the market often underestimates the persistence of losses, particularly among 
unfranked and non-dividend paying firms. We present the results of estimating and pricing 
the persistence of accruals and cash flow after controlling for loss observations in panel C of 
Table 5. Again our tests include controls for firm size. Results in the first column of panel C 
suggest that, for profit making firms, there is no evidence that the market misprices the 
accrual or cash flow components of earnings, a result which also holds for firms which do 
not pay dividends (second column). In both cases investors appear to underestimate the 
implications of accruals for future returns when the firm reports a loss (i.e., the coefficient 
on NEG*ACCRUALS is positive and significant). For firms which pay unfranked dividends 
(column 3) we find that, for profit making firms, investors overweight (rather than 
underweight) the implications of accruals and cash flows for future returns, although this is 
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not the case for loss making firms (i.e., the coefficients on CFO and ACCRUALS are both 
negative and significant). For firms paying partially franked dividends (column 4), there is 
some evidence of investors underweighting the implication of CFO for future returns, but 
not for accruals (i.e., the coefficient on CFO is positive and significant). Finally, in the last 
column of Panel C we find that for firms paying fully franked dividends there is no evidence 
of mispricing of accruals or cash flows for profit or loss making firms.  In general, we 
characterize our results as suggesting that the market more efficiently prices accruals and 
cash flows once we distinguish between profit making and loss making firms.  
 
To address concerns about the implications of omitted variables in our tests of the market 
pricing of cash flows and accruals (Kraft et al. 1997), we redo the analysis in Table 5 by 
adding additional explanatory variables to our pricing equation. Results of this analysis are 
reported in Table 6. Results in panel A agree with the corresponding results from Table 5 
(panel B), with one exception. For the full sample, evidence remains that investors 
underweight both cash flows and accruals (coefficients on CFO and ACCRUALS are 0.143 
(t=5.76) and 0.060 (t=2.56) respectively). Investors also underweight cash flows and accruals 
for the non-dividend paying observations (positive coefficients on CFO and ACCRUALS), 
and underweight cash flows for the sample of firms paying fully franked dividends. The 
primary difference between results in panel A of Table 6 and panel B of Table 5 is that in 
our expanded model (Table 6), there is evidence that investors underweight cash flows for 
the firms paying unfranked dividends (the coefficient on CFO is 0.310 (t=1.81)).  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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Panel B of Table 6 reports results of estimating our expanded model while including controls 
for loss-making firms. Results in the first column of panel B suggest there is far less evidence 
that the market misprices the accrual or cash flow component of earnings for the full sample 
when we control for loss-making. The coefficients on CFO, ACCRUALS, and NEG*CFO 
are not statistically different from zero, while the coefficient on NEG*ACCRUALS is 
significant only at the 10% level. The remaining columns in panel B of table 6 show that the 
persistence of accruals and cash flows for all dividend classifications are correctly priced 
(using significance cut-offs of 5%, the coefficients on ACCRUALS, CFO, 
NEG*ACCRUALS and NEG*CFO are not statistically different from zero).  
 
5. SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
We perform a number of sensitivity tests. First, we control for firm age in the basic earnings 
persistence models by including the log of years listed as an additional control variable 
(AGE) and then also including the effect of firm age on the extent to which firms paying 
franked dividends have more persistent earnings (i.e., FRANK*EARN*AGE). None of our 
conclusions are affected. In untabulated results all dividend payers have more persistent 
earnings than non-dividend payers, although non-dividend payers have more persistent 
earnings as they age. There is no incremental effect of firm age on the earnings persistence 
of firms paying franked dividends (i.e., FRANK*ERAN*AGE is not significant).  
 
Our sample period spans the introduction of IFRS standards in Australia. That is, earnings 
are subject to different rules from 2005 onwards. We address the potential impact of this in a 
number of ways. First, we repeat all of our persistence tests but exclude observations where 
year t+1 earnings are the first year of IFRS-based financial statements, and year t earnings 
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determined by Australian GAAP. We next estimate the persistence regressions on pre- and 
post–IFRS samples. Our results are robust to these additional tests; the introduction of IFRS 
did not change the impact of dividends and franking credit information on the persistence of 
earnings, and results are consistent for both pre-IFRS and post-IFRS samples.15  
 
We also consider whether all forms of payments indicate greater earnings persistence. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) posit that the precise form by which a cash payout occurs 
does not matter. However, there are different reasons for distributing cash in different 
forms. Special dividends and off-market buy-backs are more likely to be used by mature 
firms with excessive franking credits. On-market buy-backs are used by younger firms with 
excess cash. However, we find no evidence that a measure reflecting all forms of corporate 
payouts indicates more persistent earnings.16 Only recurring dividends are a signal of greater 
earnings persistence. 
 
There is also evidence that a change in the level of franking credits indicates a change in 
earnings persistence. We therefore include within the earnings persistence model intercept 
and slope terms for firms that increase (decrease) the level of franking credits. We find that 
firms that decrease franking credits have significantly less persistent earnings, while firms 
that increase franking credits while also reporting a loss have less persistent losses. Finally, 
firms that pay higher dividends (as measured by dividend yield) have highly persistent 
earnings. 
 
                                                 
15 Results of these additional tests are not tabulated to conserve the paper’s length, but are available upon 
request from the authors.  
16 Full details are available from the authors. 
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To supplement our market pricing tests, we use the Mishkin (1983) methodology (Sloan, 
1996; Bradshaw et al., 2001; Xie, 2001; Collins et al., 2003; Hanlon, 2005). The Mishkin test 
assumes market efficiency, and therefore that only unexpected information in earnings 
affects future abnormal returns. If markets efficiently price the differential earnings 
persistence of firms classified by distribution types, then there should be no correlation 
between future abnormal returns and the expected level of earnings persistence.  
 
If the information in dividends and franking credits is informative about future earnings then 
we expect there to be little difference between expected and priced earnings persistence for 
firms that pay franked dividends. Similarly, if there is less information signaled about 
earnings by firms that distribute no dividends or where dividends distributed are unfranked 
the market would be less likely to correctly price the earnings persistence. Results and 




Australian firms generally have low earnings persistence. It is therefore important to be able 
to identify circumstances where investors can identify incrementally more persistent earnings 
series. We argue that earnings persistence is a function of the profitability life cycle. Firms are 
expected to have more volatile earnings as they establish profitability. As they enter a steady 
state of profitability earnings become more persistent. Because dividends and higher franking 
credits are expected to reflect stages in the life cycle, they are also expected  to be  
informative about earnings persistence.  
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We find strong evidence that Australian firms that pay dividends are associated with more 
persistent earnings and less persistent profits. The evidence is consistent with persistence 
increasing as firms mature. Firms paying unfranked dividends are typically trying to establish 
profitability. Unfranked dividend payers have more persistent earnings than non-dividend 
payers but less persistent earnings than more mature, franked dividend payers. Franked 
dividend payers are expected to be in a more mature, stable phase of the life cycle. Consistent 
with this reasoning, we find that these firms have more persistent profits. Compared to 
unfranked dividend payers, franked dividend payers have significantly less persistent losses.  
 
Our market tests provide strong support for the market pricing earnings and its components 
consistent with our predictions. In particular, there is little evidence of mispricing after 
including a dummy variable and appropriate interaction terms for losses in our pricing model. 
The market on average gets it right, and this is most strongly evident when firms pay fully 
franked dividends. Although there is limited evidence of mispricing even after controlling for 
the presence of a loss, our overall conclusion is that the market does not appear to fixate on 
earnings. 
 
While it is widely believed that dividends serve as a ‘signal’, the existing evidence addressing 
the information content of dividends yields relatively weak results (Skinner and Soltes, 2011). 
One explanation is that dividends serve as a signal about earnings attributes (or earnings 
‘quality’), and this is the interpretation offered by Skinner and Soltes for their evidence that 
dividend-paying firms have more persistent earnings. However, such evidence still begs the 
question as to ‘why’ dividends are informative about earnings persistence. Our evidence 
using information about earnings and the tax status of the dividend (i.e., franking status) 
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provides some explanation for this result, namely that dividends serve as a signal of earnings 
persistence because dividends also reflect firms’ life cycle stage, and earnings reflects this too. 
Our results showing the tax status of dividends has incremental informativeness for earnings 
persistence reinforces our interpretation of the results.  
 
Of course, we do not directly test the argument that life cycles are determinants of earnings 
persistence. Rather, we assume this to be the case, and therefore predict that dividends and 
their tax status will distinguish more (less) persistent profits (losses). Our results should 
therefore be seen as evidence in support of one explanation as to why dividends are viewed 
as important signals. The extent to which other explanations exist for signalling properties of 
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 Table 1  
Sample Construction 
 
Firm-year observations in Aspect database over 1 January 
1993 to 31 December 2010 
 
27,121 
   Less: 
  Missing accounting data (including requirements  
 
6,880 
for lagged and one year ahead variables) 
  Missing share price and return data 
 
1,109 
Financial firms and Property Trusts 
 
1,832 
Less top and bottom 1% of current year earnings and one 
year ahead earnings 
 
637 
   Final sample 
 
16,663 




































































































































































FRANK   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.81   1.00   0.38   -212.35*** 
Notes: 
Sample of 16,670 observations selected from ASPECT and SPPR over 1993-2010 as described in Table 1. Where: 
REV ($m) = Sales (Aspect item 7090) 
OPAT ($m) = Operating income after tax (Aspect item 100); 
CFO ($m) = Cash flow from operating activities (Aspect item 9100); 
TA($m) = Total assets at end of financial year (Aspect item 5090); 




= Market-adjusted buy-hold return, measured as raw buy–hold returns inclusive of dividends and subtracting the buy-hold 
return on a value-weighted portfolio of ASX-listed firms. The 12 month return accumulation period begins three months after 
the fiscal year-end of the year in which the financial variables are measured;  
ACCRUALS = OPAT less CFO, scaled by prior year TA; 
NEG = Indicator variable taking the value of “1” if OPAT is negative, and zero otherwise; 
FRANK = Indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the firm paid a franked dividend, and zero otherwise; 
TAX ($m) = Tax paid our as per cash flow statement (Aspect item 9075) 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively for t-tests of differences in mean values between non-dividend payers and 
dividend payers. 
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Table 3  
Regressions of Future Earnings on Current Earnings, Dividends and Franking Credits 
 


























        DIV*EARN 0.326 
 
(5.78)*** 

























        FRANK 




    FRANK*EARN 




    FRANK*NEG*EARN 




    FFRANK 














            Observations 16,631 
   
6,170 
   
4,632 
  Adjusted R2 36%       18%       19%     
 
Notes:  
The dependent variable is one year ahead earnings (EARNt+1). The t-values are based on two-way robust standard errors, clustered by firm and 
year.  
EARN = OPATt divided by TAt-1 
DIV = Indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the firm paid a dividend in year t and zero otherwise 
FRANK = Indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the firm paid a franked dividend in year t and zero otherwise 
FFRANK = Indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the firm paid a fully franked dividend in year t and zero otherwise 
Other variables defined in Table 2. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table 4 
Regressions of Future Earnings on Current Earnings, Dividend and Franking Credits  
 
Panel A: Earnings and dividends                            
 
Firm size                           
 
1 (small)     2     3     4     5 (large)   
Variable Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value 

















































































 Panel B: Earnings and franked dividends                   
 
Firm size                          
 
1 (small)    2     3     4     5 (large)   
 
Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value 








































































 Adjusted R2 16%     17%     18%     18%     19%   
(continued) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Earnings and fully franked dividends                    
 
Firm size                          
 
1 (small)    2     3     4     5 (large)   
 
Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value   Estimate  t-value 



















































































The dependent variable is one year ahead earnings (EARNt+1). The t-values are based on two-way robust standard errors, clustered by firm and 
year. Firm size portfolios are formed by ranking observations on start of year total assets. Variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3. 
 





OLS regressions of future returns on earnings, cash flows, and accruals  
 
Panel A: Regressions of future returns on earnings 
 
 






All firms  
 






























































Adj. R2 0.5% 
   
0.5% 
   
0.5% 
   
0.4% 
   
0.3% 
  Observations 16,321 
   
10,147 
   
1,146 
   
1,113 
   
3,915 
   
Panel B: Regressions of future returns on cash flows and accruals 

























































Adj. R2 0.5% 
   
0.6% 
   
0.6% 
   
2.0% 
   
1.0% 
  Observations 16,321 
   
10,147 
   
1,146 
   
1,113 
   
3,915 
  



















































































































Adj. R2 0.8% 
   
0.6% 
   
2.0% 
   
2.0% 
   
1.0% 
  Observations 16,321 
   
10,147 
   
1,146 
   
1,113 
   
3,915 




Notes:   
 
Firms with RETURNt+1 of greater than 4 have been excluded. SIZE is an indicator variable based on quintile rankings using beginning-of-year 
total assets. Parameter estimates for the size indicator variables are not reported in the table to save space (but are available upon request from 
the authors). The t-statistics are based on two-way robust standard errors, clustered by firm and year. Other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 
3. 
 




Table 6  
OLS regressions of future returns on earnings, cash flows, and accruals and additional explanatory variables 
 
Panel A: Cash flows, accruals and additional controls 
 






All firms  
 



































































































































































































Adj. R2 0.6% 
   
0.6% 
   
2.0% 
   
2.0% 
   
2.0% 
  Observations 14426 
   
9,297 
   
995 
   
910 
   
3,224 
                      





































































































































































































































Adj. R2 0.6% 
   
0.6% 
   
3.0% 
   
3.0% 
   
2.0% 
  Observations 14426 
   
9,297 
   
995 
   
910 
   
3,224 
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Notes: 
Observations where RETURNt+1 exceed 4 have been excluded. CFO is cash from operations scaled by start of year total assets. SIZE is an indicator variable 
based on quintile rankings using beginning-of-year total assets. Parameter estimates for the size indicator variables are not reported in the table to save space 
(but are available upon request from the authors). The t-values are based on two-way robust standard errors, clustered by firm and year.  
 
∆REV is change in REV from year t-1 to year t. 
∆CAPEX is the change in CAPEX from year t-1 to year t. 
 
Other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
